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Hong Kong’s Banking Industry
Facing Keen Competition
With special reference to the opportunities open to the banks after
China’s entry to the WTO
Peter Chiu
1 In Hong Kong, the development of the banking system is an important aspect of its
economic development. Government statistics show that at the end of December 2002
there were 133 licensed banks, 46 restricted banks, and 45 deposit-taking companies in
Hong Kong. Most of the major foreign banks have branches in Hong Kong. All of the
above have made Hong Kong the international financial centre that it is,  and today
flourishing in  the field  of  offshore banking.  Moreover,  since 1979 when China first
began to open its economy, banks in Hong Kong have provided finance to many China
development projects 1. 
2 There is no central bank in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA),
set up in 1995, performs most of the functions of a central bank, except for the issue of
banknotes,  which  function  is  entrusted  to  three  commercial  banks,  namely,  the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (a British bank), the Standard Chartered
Bank  (a  British  bank)  and  the  Bank  of  China.  The  HKMA  is  the  authority  for  the
regulation of the banking industry. It is also a lender of last resort to the commercial
banks. One major function of the HKMA is to operate the linked rate system, which
Hong Kong adopted in October 1983, and under which the HK dollar is linked to the US
dollar at the rate of US$1:HK$7.8. The linked rate system is considered to be the corner
stone  of  Hong  Kong’s  economic  and  financial  stability  and  the  government  is
determined to maintain it 2.
3 The deposit-taking companies appeared in the early seventies. Their number increased
rapidly and the Deposit-Taking Company Ordinance was passed in 1976 requiring such
companies to be registered under the ordinance and be governed by it. Initially two
types of  financial  institution,  very different  in  nature,  were required to  register  as
deposit-taking  companies,  1)  “finance  companies”,  which  received  deposits  and
engaged in businesses such as hire-purchase financing, stock financing and personal
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loans;  and  2)  “merchant  banks”,  representative  offices  of  overseas  banks  which
registered  as  deposit-taking  companies  because  no  banking  licences  were  granted
during the  period 1964-1978.  These  merchant  banks  engaged in  businesses  such as
corporate finance, financial consultancy and investment management. They were later
granted the title “Restricted Banks”. Thus, Hong Kong’s banking system is a three-tier
system consisting of the licensed banks, restricted banks and deposit-taking companies
3.
4 From July 1964 to July 2001 the Interest Rate Agreement (IRA), a cartel type agreement
between the banks, was in force and required licensed banks to observe the Interest
Rate Rules of the IRA. The purpose of setting up the IRA in 1964 was to maintain orderly
business  operations  within  the  banking  industry.  While  the  IRA  does  not  apply  to
deposit-taking companies or restricted banks as their business differs from that of the
licensed banks, they are subject to stricter rules on receiving deposits from the public.
The IRA, considered to be a hindrance to competition and efficiency, was abolished in
July 2001. Its abolishment has resulted in keen competition between the banks in Hong
Kong. There have been winners and losers as a result of this major change. 
5 China’s entry to the WTO has tremendous implications for Hong Kong. With China’s
opening  up  in  1979,  a  process  of  economic  integration  between  Hong  Kong  and
mainland China  began.  Hong Kong benefited  from the  investment  opportunities  in
China,  acting  as  an  entrepôt  between  China  and  the  West,  and  the  provision  of
commercial and financial services to the mainland. Now that China has gained entry to
WTO, it is expected that Hong Kong can play a more important role in China’s economic
development 4. 
6 A condition of membership is that China should open up its banking industry to foreign
banks. Foreign banks, including Hong Kong’s banks, can now operate in China, albeit
with conditions and restrictions.  However,  these conditions and restrictions will  be
relaxed gradually until the foreign banks are free to do business in all parts of China.
This has provided the Hong Kong banks with new opportunities to expand into the
mainland.
7 This article will examine the banking environment in Hong Kong following the Asian
financial  crisis,  and  especially  after  interest  rates  deregulation  in  July  2001.  The
opportunities for Hong Kong’s banks after China’s entry to the WTO are also analysed.
Hong Kong’s banking environment after the Asian financial crisis
8 The Asian financial  crisis  left  many Asian countries’  banking systems in ruins.  The
sudden  massive  outflow  of  money  from  the  Asian region  was  disastrous  for  these
fragile  structures.  They  were  poorly  managed  and  lacked  proper  supervision  and
regulation. Banks in these countries granted excessive loans to risky projects such as
property, stocks and unsecured personal loans. When the Asian financial crisis took
place resulting in drastic falls in the prices of property and stocks, borrowers were
unable  to  repay  their  debts,  and  banks  found themselves  facing  crushing  financial
difficulties. 
9 Banks in Hong Kong escaped disaster; mainly because the industry is well regulated and
the banks themselves are financially sound, e.g.,  they are not allowed to hold more
than 40% of their assets in property related assets;  they can only finance mortgage
borrowers for 70% of their mortgage loans; and they normally hold a capital adequacy
ratio of 18%, much higher than the international requirement of 12%. 
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10 Although banks in Hong Kong are financially sound, they had a hard time during the
Asian financial crisis and thereafter. The drastic fall in the demand for loans has led to
great  falls  in  their  profits.  Many  banks  have  had  to  cut  back  on  their  expenses,
downsizing as a result, needing to find new sources of income other than from lending.
Many have expanded into insurance, stock brokerage, bond finance, etc. 
 
Table 1: Loans and advances by type of authorised institutions (HKD billion)
Source: Table 2.4, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong
government, mai 2002.
11 Table 1 shows the loans and advances by type by authorised institutions in Hong Kong.
All types of loans have fallen drastically since 1997. The total amount of loans in 2001
was just about half of the total in 1997. The item “Other loans for use outside Hong
Kong” dropped from HK$1,843 billion in 1997 to HK$295 billion in 2001, revealing a
drastic fall in offshore lending. The item “Finance to merchandising trade not touching
Hong Kong” refers to banks providing finance to Hong Kong businessmen to export
their goods produced in mainland China directly from mainland Chinese ports. A kind
of offshore lending by nature, this has also fallen drastically since 1997. There has also
been a fall in the item “Other loans for use in Hong Kong”, which explains the slowing
down of lending within Hong Kong. 
12 Table 2 shows the external liabilities and claims of Hong Kong banks vis-à-vis major
countries from 1997 to 2001. Two points are worth noting. First, the liabilities to banks
outside Hong Kong in US dollars dropped significantly from 3,726 billion in 1997 to
1,313  billion  in  2001.  This  reveals  that  foreign  banks  have  withdrawn  substantial
amounts of money from banks in Hong Kong. This is a clear consequence of the Asian
financial crisis when there was huge capital outflow. Second, the claims on non-bank
customers outside Hong Kong in US dollars also saw a huge fall from 2,049 billion in
1997 to 579 billion in 2001. This implies that banks in Hong Kong have reduced their
offshore lending considerably, which reinforces the findings from Table 1.
13 Table 3 shows the principal statistics for all banks in Hong Kong from 1996 to 2000
(Figures  for  2001 are  not  yet  available).  Several  points  are  worth noting.  First,  the
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number of banks has fallen from 186 in 1996 to 158 in 2000. This is mainly due to the
retreat of some Japanese banks after the Asian financial crisis (The number of banks
had increased again to 179 by the end of 2002). Second, syndication of loans dropped
considerably in 1998 and 1999, but increased again in 2000. This is due to increased
domestic lending to companies following a short-lived economic recovery in 2000 (See
Table 4). Third, there is a large increase in “dividends received and profit from trading
in securities” in 1999, due mainly to the rebound in share prices in 1999 after price
collapses in 1998 during the Asian financial crisis.
14 Table 4 shows the GDP growth, unemployment rate and inflation rate of Hong Kong in
the past years. These indicators unanimously point to the slowing down of the economy
after the Asian financial crisis, with adverse effects on the business of the banks. After a
short-lived  recovery  in  1999  and  2000,  GDP  again  slowed  in  2001  and  2002.
Unemployment increased to 7% in 2002. Deflation has been prolonged for four years so
far.  The  slowing  down  of  the  Hong  Kong  economy  is  due  mainly  to  the  adverse
economic situation worldwide after September 11th,  structural  change and sluggish
consumption within Hong Kong. 
15 The above analysis reveals that banks in Hong Kong faced a difficult time after the
Asian financial crisis,  with a fall  in loans both in the domestic market and offshore
markets. Competition for business was certainly keen. It was under these conditions
that the deregulation of the IRR took place, which made competition keener. 
Deregulation of the IRR
16 July  3rd  2001  was  an  important  date  in  the  development  of  Hong  Kong's  banking
industry. On that day the Interest Rate Agreement (IRA) of the HKAB was abolished.
Banks  in  Hong  Kong  now  set their  interest  rates  on  deposits  and  loans.  Prior  to
deregulation, banks had to observe a uniform lending rate, called the prime rate, and a
set of uniform deposit rates. 
 
Table 2: External liabilities and claims of banks in Hong Kong (Positions vis-à-vis major countries,
HKD billion)
Source: Table 2.9, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, May 2002.
17 Under the IRA a cartel-type interest rate arrangement was practiced for more than
three decades. The arrangement was initially regarded as necessary for maintaining
banking  stability.  However,  the  arrangement  gradually  became  an  obstacle  for
competition and efficiency. The result was that the depositors and the borrowers were
being exploited. The depositors obtained excessively low deposit rates from the banks,
and the borrowers had to pay excessively high lending rates for their loans. 
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18 Although  the  IRA  contributed  to  banking  stability  by maintaining  orderly  banking
operations  within  the  banking  system,  it  was  increasingly  felt  that  the  cartel-type
arrangement seriously handicapped competition. Inefficient banks and efficient banks
operated under the same interest rate rules. Efficient banks were not allowed to offer
higher deposit rates to bid for deposits, nor could they offer loans at rates lower than
the prime rate.
19 It was also found that the wide spread between the lending rates and the deposit rates
resulted in large profit margins for the banks. This could not have occurred but for the
monopoly power of the HKAB in setting interest rates. Professor KY Chan, who was
appointed by the  government  as  the  president  of  the  Consumer Council,  was  most
active in requesting the government for the abolishment of the IRA. Professor Chan
pointed out that the cartel-type IRA impeded competition and enabled the banks to
reap gigantic profits, exploiting depositors and borrowers.
20 Professor Chan's proposal to abolish the IRA was accepted by the government, in spite
of  strong  objections  from  the  banks.  It  was  abolished  in  stages.  In  the  first  stage,
effective  from  July  1999,  interest  rates  on  deposits  longer  than  seven  days  were
deregulated. In the second stage, effective from July 2000, interest rates on deposits of
less than seven days were deregulated. In the last stage, effective from 3 July 2001,
interest rates on all deposits were completely deregulated. 
21 As  to  lending  rates,  deregulation  in  fact  started  from  July  2000,  a  year  ahead  of
complete interest rate deregulation. Banks began to offer lending rates lower than the
prime rate  set  by the HKAB.  At  first  a  lending rate  1% lower than prime rate  was
offered  by  banks  to  compete  for  mortgages.  Gradually  competition  resulted  in  the
mortgage rate dropping to 2.5% below the prime rate. For mortgage borrowers it was
astonishing. Accompanied by a continuously dropping prime rate as a result of the link
with US interest rates under the linked exchange rate system, mortgage rates dropped
further. Compared with the mortgage rates charged by the banks several years ago,
mortgage rates are considerably lower. 
22 Following complete deregulation of the IRR on July 3rd 2001 banks each announced
their own prime rate. As to deposit rates, each bank declared a "basic saving deposit
rate (BSDR)" to which its deposit rates would be linked. Deposits of larger amounts
would enjoy a  deposit  rate  higher  than the BSDR and deposits  of  smaller  amounts
would have a deposit rate lower than the BSDR. Some banks even declared not to offer
any interest rate for small amounts of deposits such as deposits of less than HK$5,000.
Table  5  shows  the  deposit  rate  offered  by  the  Hongkong  &  Shanghai  Banking
Corporation.
23 Smaller banks decided to offer deposit rates higher than those offered by the Hongkong
& Shanghai  Banking Corporation in  order  to  bid  for  deposits.  For  example,  a  local
Chinese bank, Wing Lung Bank, offered the deposit rates as shown in Table 6 below. 
24 Prime rates and basic savings rates in turn are set by reference to interbank rates.
Under the linked rate system, when interest rates in the USA are reduced, money will
flow into HK dollars. The increased liquidity in the money markets will exert downward
pressure on interbank rates. As interbank rates reflect the market levels of interest
rates and the costs of funds for banks, banks will set their prime rates and basic savings
deposit rates by reference to the interbank rates. 
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25 There was no sudden shock for the banking system upon the complete deregulation of
the IRA. Deregulation had in fact started long before July 3rd 2001, the banks and the
public were well prepared for the event. However the event represented an important
milestone in the development of banking in Hong Kong. Competition would certainly
become  keener  among  the  banks  thereafter.  But  with  it  would  come  enhanced
efficiency and benefits for depositors and borrowers. 
26 Who are the winners in the deregulation? Obviously the mortgage borrowers are the
first among  the  winners.  Before  deregulation,  mortgage  borrowers  had  to  borrow
normally at interest rates 1% higher than the prime rate. After deregulation, they were
able  to  borrow at  interest  rates  2.5% below the prime rate.  The difference is  3.5%.
Assume that a person borrows HK$1 million from a bank for a mortgage, the saving in
interest per annum amounts to HK$35,000. 
27 Other  types  of  borrowers  such  as  commercial  and  industrial  firms  also  benefit,
although to a lesser extent. Without the restriction of the prime rate rule, banks can
now lend money to these firms at lower rates than previously. However, it must be
pointed out that after the Asian financial crisis, banks have become very cautious when
lending to the commercial and the industrial sectors. Unless they can prove that they
have the potential to make profits, the banks are reluctant to provide them loans. 
 
Table 3: Prinicipal statistics for banks in Hong Kong (HKD billion)
Source: Table 5.12, ‘Principal Statistics for licensed Banks in Hong Kong’, Hong Kong annual Digest of
Statistics, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government, 2002.
28 Property developers are also among the winners. The reduction in mortgage interest
rates  has  resulted in  increased demand for  properties.  This  has  helped to  halt  the
falling property prices following the Asian financial crisis. At present property prices
are just  40% of  their  peak levels  in 1997.  The increased demand for properties  has
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prevented prices continuing to fall. However, there is still no sign that property prices
will rise in the near future, as economic growth remains slow and deflation persists. 
29 Competition among the banks  has  resulted in  new methods of  finance provided to
mortgage borrowers. Some banks are now offering “cash rebates” up to 8% of the loans
to the mortgage borrowers.  Property developers  also compete for  buyers with new
methods of payment terms. Some have set up their own subsidiary finance companies
to provide second mortgages to their buyers up to 25% of the purchase price (banks can
only provide 70% of  the purchase price in a  first  mortgage).  Some even offer  such
favourable terms as to waive the interest and principal of the second mortgage for the
first  two  years.  This  provides  liquidity  to  property  buyers  in  the  early  years  of
becoming  property  owners.  The  term  “Zero  Downpayment”  has  emerged.  This  is
because the bank provides 70% first mortgage and grants up to 8% cash rebate of the
mortgage loan (equivalent to 5% of the purchase price) while the property developer
provides a 25% second mortgage, which totals 100% of the purchase price. So no initial
downpayment is needed.
30 In spite of the favourable terms offered by banks and property developers, potential
buyers certainly will consider their ability to pay. This is affected by their view of the
security of their jobs and the future trend of interest rates.  As the economy is still
stagnant, with the unemployment rate staying high, confidence has not yet recovered.
Those who buy properties  for  investment,  i.e.  for  renting,  will  consider the risk of
falling rents along with greater supply of flats in the rental market.
31 The Mortgage Corporation, which was set up by the government several years ago to
provide  additional  loans  (up  to  90%)  to  mortgage  borrowers  above  the  70% of  the
property  value  permitted  to  banks,  has  increased  the  loan  amount  to  140% of  the
property  value.  This  facility  is  to  provide  assistance  to  those  who  have  bought
properties at peak prices in 1997 and have now become the owners of “negative asset”
properties.  By  restructuring  their  loans  with  the  140%  finance,  these  owners  of
“negative asset” properties can enjoy the lower interest rates provided by banks now.
However  these  property  owners  have  to  cover  insurance  by  paying  a  lump  sum
insurance premium to the Mortgage Corporation for the part of the mortgage loan in
excess of 70%. 
32 In the latest development, the HKMA has allowed banks to offer mortgage loans of up
to 90%, but must also cover insurance for the 20% in excess of the 70% permitted to
them.  This  is  the  “one  station  mortgage”,  as  the  borrower  only  needs  to  file  one
application to the bank. (Previously the mortgage borrower had to file an application to
the bank for the 70% mortgage and another application to the Mortgage Corporation
for the extra 20%). This new measure is aimed at simplifying the application procedure
thereby providing the borrower greater convenience when applying for a mortgage.
33 Keen competition among banks for mortgage lending has resulted in smaller profit
margins for the banks. As banks are mostly awash with deposits and facing low demand
for loans from industry, mortgages provide them an outlet for their funds. Also the
default rate is comparatively low being only 1% on average over time. The low risk is
the result of the restriction imposed by the HKMA that mortgage borrowers’ monthly
repayments should not exceed 50% of their monthly income. 
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Table 4: Real growth rate, unemployment rate and inflation rate
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
34 Who then are the losers of interest rate deregulation? The small depositors. Banks are
now more concerned about their funding costs. One way to reduce theses costs is to
reduce interest rates paid to small depositors. Some banks have even imposed charges
for deposits smaller than HK$1,000. This has naturally led to complaints. Many people
protest  that  banks  are  discriminating  against  poor  people,  as  small  depositors  are
normally the elderly or economically weak. Social activists have criticised banks for not
taking their  social  responsibility  to  take  care  of  these  people.  Most  elderly  people
receive old age subsidies from the government through their saving accounts in banks.
Those who obtain social welfare subsidies from the government also are drawing their
money through their saving accounts. In response to these criticisms most banks have
announced a waiver on the charges on small deposits for these categories of depositors.
35 As a whole, deregulation of the IRR was an unavoidable development. The view of the
HKMA is that deregulation is the right way to go.  While the IRR did serve a useful
stabilising function in the past, they became increasingly outdated in a mature banking
system like Hong Kong’s. They imposed a rigidity and inefficiencies in the setting of
deposit rates and lending rates and inhibited the development of new banking products
5. 
36 However the HKMA is also concerned about consumer protection. As mentioned above,
deregulation  of  interest  rates  is  likely  to  lead  to  increases  in  fees  and charges  for
banking services. While the HKMA does not regulate fees and charges, it has a strong
interest  in  ensuring  that  the  pricing  structure  of  banks  is  transparent  and  that
customers are given sufficient notice of any fee adjustments. The HKMA also considers
that, while banks are free to determine their charging policy, they should be sensitive
to  the  impact  of  increases  in  charges  on  small  account  holders  and  the
disproportionate effect that such charges can have on the more vulnerable members of
the communities. Advises on this matter has been given by the HKMA to the banks
which have subsequently introduced various privileged measures for elderly people
receiving old age subsidies,  and those  who obtain social  welfare  subsidies,  through
their saving accounts 6.
Strategies adopted amid keen competition
37 Strategies have been adopted by banks to beat the competition developing within the
banking system, including increasing their share in the mortgage market, promotion
campaigns and special counters in branches for the promotion of mortgage business.
Some banks offer telephone enquiry services for mortgage facilities operating even on
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Saturday and Sunday. As mentioned earlier, banks are now providing cash rebates to
mortgage borrowers. 
38 As interest-earning business is becoming more difficult, banks are increasingly relying
on non-interest earning business,  such as insurance,  provident fund business,  stock
transactions,  sale  of  bonds,  etc.  These  types  of  business  are  not  traditionally  the
business of banks in Hong Kong. However they have in the past few years stepped into
these businesses to widen their sources of income. Banks in other countries, however,
took this step much earlier. 
39 The law provides that from December 2000 all employers should provide a mandatory
provident  fund  (MPF)  scheme  for  their  employees.  The  law  gives  the  insurance
companies and the banks the right to market provident fund products and collect fund
contributions from their clients. The moneys are then entrusted to the merchant banks
for investment and provision of pensions. The practice is new in Hong Kong and has
provided the banks with new business. 
 
Table 5: Deposit rates offered by the HSBC, July 3rd 2001.
Source: Xinbao, July 4th 2001.
 
Table 6: Deposit rates offered by the Wing Lung Bank, July 3rd 2001
Source: Xinbao, July 4th 2001
40 Recently banks have found themselves involved in another new business, namely, the
sale of bonds for large corporations such as the Mortgage Corporation and the Mass
Transit Railway. As banks have large branch networks their networks are considered
ideal channels for selling these bonds. Bonds used to be issued through the merchant
banks,  but  are  now  issued  in  smaller  denominations  and  the  banks  have  in  effect
become bond retailers.
41 The  emphasis  on  diversifying  into  non-interest  earning  businesses  means  greater
demand for expertise among bank staff. Bank staff are now required to study the MPF
rules  and to attend examinations to obtain licences from the government.  The law
provides that no-one without a licence can deal in MPF. To be able to deal in insurance
products  and bonds,  bank staff  must  also  learn about  investment and related sales
procedures. To be able to deal in stocks they need to acquire knowledge about shares
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and the rules of stock operations. As a whole, as competition between banks increases
so does the pressure on bank staff. 
42 Consolidation  and  mergers  have  increased.  Local  Chinese  banks  in  Hong  Kong  are
traditionally resistant to consolidation and merger.  Many of these banks are family
businesses and have tried to maintain family control. However as competition becomes
increasingly keen the limited resources of the family may not be sufficient to introduce
the technical innovations needed to stand against competition. At the same time some
foreign banks need business partners in order to expand into Hong Kong. Now that
China has gained entry to the WTO, having a banking base in Hong Kong for the foreign
banks  is  a  stepping-stone  to  doing  banking  business  in  China.  Recently  the
Development Bank of Singapore made a successful bid to take over the Dao Hang Bank,
a local Chinese bank. It is expected that some local Chinese banks will be taken over by
other foreign banks in the future. The HKMA has also encouraged banks to merge in
order to benefit from economies of scale 7.
 
Table 7 : Major balance sheet items by country/region of ownership of authorised institutions (HKD
billion)
Source: Table G, Annual Report 2001, Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
43 In order to maintain its market share and to benefit from economies of scale the group
of twelve mainland Chinese banks with the Bank of China at their head introduced
restructuring and merged with the Bank of China. The restructuring was completed at
the end of 2001. Other examples are the merger of the Kong On Bank (a local Chinese
Bank) with the Singapore Overseas Trust Bank and the merger of the First Pacific Bank
(a local Chinese bank) with the Bank of East Asia (a leading local Chinese bank). 
44 Banks are making efforts to increase their ability to master new technology available
for raising efficiency, especially e-banking. By the end of 2001 over twenty banks and
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banking groups in Hong Kong have introduced Internet banking services. To ensure
proper  supervision  of  this  aspect  of  banking  development,  in  May 2001  the  HKMA
issued the “Guidelines on Authorisation of Virtual Banks”, aimed at banks that deliver
banking services wholly or primarily using the Internet or other electronic delivery
channels. It operates on the principle that the HKMA will permit the establishment of
virtual banks in Hong Kong provided they can satisfy the same prudential criteria that
apply to conventional banks 8.
45 Another area of competition is credit card business, a traditional business of the banks.
Keen competition has occurred in this area with the result that banks have become less
cautious in issuing credit cards and granting credit facilities. Credit card bad debts have
increased rapidly. According to the statistics released by the HKMA, credit card default
rates  reached 12.8% in  the  first  quarter  of  2002,  and as  banks  have  engaged debt-
collecting  companies,  complaints  have  increased  with  regard  to  the  ensuing  debt-
collection practices. HKMA statistics also show that in the first half of 2002 there were
479 complaints and nearly half were related to the debt-collection practices of these
companies. Notice has been given by the HKMA to the banks requiring them to improve
their  relationship  with  debtors  and  the  debt-collecting  companies.  Banks  are  also
required respond to these complaints by the end of each quarter 9. 
46 Competition  results  in  changing  market  share  over  time.  Table  7  shows  the  major
balance sheet items by country/region of ownership of all banks in Hong Kong from
1996 to 2001. It can be seen that mainland Chinese banks (merged with the Bank of
China at end of 2001) now occupy the largest market share in terms of deposits and
loans—a result  of  rapid expansion of banking activities by mainland banks in Hong
Kong. In contrast, Japanese banks have considerably reduced their lending activities in
Hong Kong. US banks maintain a significant and steadily growing market share, and the
market share of the European banks as a group is also substantial with steady growth in
deposits in Hong Kong. It is worth noting that the market share of local Chinese banks
is not listed due perhaps to their insignificant market share.
Opportunities open to banks in Hong Kong after China’s entry to the WTO
47 China gained entry to the WTO at the end of 2001. The World Bank's recent estimates
give an indication of the growth potential of China's trade as a result—China's share in
world trade will double within the next five years and its share of world exports is
expected to increase from the present 3.7% to around 7.3% by 2005. China's share in
world imports is expected to rise from the present 3.4% to 7% within the next five
years. 
48 China’s  accession  also  has  great  implications  for  Hong  Kong’s  banking  sector.
According to the framework of  the WTO agreement,  the entry requirement for  the
banking  sector  is  much  broader  and  the  reforms  more  profound.  These  not  only
provide  overseas  banks  with  tremendous  opportunities,  but  should  also  galvanise
China’s banking sector into operating in line with the international standards. 
49 The direction of reform has been established, which is to allow more market forces to
direct banking development. Market operation implies competition and it is expected
that banks in China will have a hard time competing among themselves and with the
foreign banks including the Hong Kong banks that will be set up there. 
50 As to the effect of China's accession on Hong Kong’s banking business, Joseph Yam, the
Chief Executive of the HKMA, highlighted the “the creation effect” and “the diversion
effect”. The creation effect of WTO entry will result in a surge in banking business on
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the  mainland.  There  are  two  main  elements  in  this  process.  The  first  is  a  greater
demand for banking services, resulting from the growth induced by the effects of WTO
accession. The second is the financial deepening stimulated by more rapid financial
liberalisation,  greater  banking competition,  and product  innovation induced by the
terms of WTO accession. These processes have positive implications for domestic banks
incorporated in the mainland and for foreign banks, including Hong Kong banks 10.
 
Table 8: An analytical framework of opportunities
Source: Table 1 in ‘Understanding Mainland Reform’, Hong Kong Government Press Release, May 17th
2001.
51 However,  beside  the  creative  effect  there  is  also  the  diversion effect.  According to
Joseph Yam, it is quite natural that foreign banks will find it attractive to deal directly
with the mainland, rather than through Hong Kong. But there should still be factors
that  encourage  them to  continue  to  use  Hong Kong as  a  base.  For  example,  given
economies of scale, it is much cheaper for foreign banks to cover their China operations
through their Hong Kong offices, rather than incurring the additional costs of setting
up a new office in, say, Shanghai. Corporate tax in Shanghai is also twice what it is in
Hong Kong. Other positive inducements include the efficiency and sophistication of
Hong Kong's financial markets, the well-regulated financial system, etc. According to
Joseph  Yam,  studies  carried  out  by  the HKMA have  found  that  the  creation  effect
outweighs  the  diversion  effect.  Hong  Kong's  banking  sector  stands  to  benefit
substantially from the increased demand for banking services in China. This will boost
Hong  Kong's  lending  business  to  China,  provided  that  Hong  Kong  can  continue  to
improve its infrastructure framework and its regulatory regime so that the diversion
effect is minimised 11.
52 The  HKMA  has  developed  a  comprehensive  analytical  framework  that  may  enable
opportunities to be identified systematically and assessed realistically. The framework
is set out in Table 8. There are altogether 48 (2 by 2 by 3 by 4) combinations of the four
headings of characteristics, representing 48 ways of doing business. For example, we
can ask ourselves what roles Hong Kong can play, if any, in renminbi banking business
on the mainland targeted at resident individuals. Another combination may be foreign
currency equity business in the mainland targeted at non-residents. Such are the many
banking business opportunities for Hong Kong banks in China 12.
53 In view of these opportunities, Hong Kong’s banks should plan ways to explore them to
their advantage. Recently, Dai Xianglong, governor of the People’s Bank of China, at a
dinner  hosted  by  the  Hong  Kong  General  Chamber  of  Commerce,  hinted  at  the
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possibility  of  banks  in  Hong  Kong  accepting  renminbi  deposits.  This  is  in  fact  a
relaxation  of  exchange  controls  between  Hong  Kong  and  mainland  China  and  is
perhaps the first step for full eventual convertibility of the renminbi.  If so, banks in
Hong Kong will be able to make renminbi loans. Although the idea is new and rather
vague at this moment, banks should be prepared to explore the opportunities open to
them once the idea becomes a reality 13.
54 On another occasion Dai hinted that, in principle, there is no reason why mainlanders
cannot invest in the Hong Kong stock market. They can invest through the Qualified
Domestic Investment Institutions (QDII). The matter is currently under study by the
central government. If this becomes a reality, not only will stock brokerage firms in
Hong Kong benefit,  the banks will  also benefit from providing banking facilities for
these financial transactions 14.
55 According to the statistics released by the International Clearing Bank, in the three
years from 1999 to 2001, China’s reserves increased by US$1,424 billion. However only
about  one  tenth of  this  has  been invested  in  Hong Kong.  The  majority  is  invested
overseas in the form of Western government bonds. If China changes its policy and
begins to increase its investment in Hong Kong, the first to benefit are the institutions
in the financial sectors, including Hong Kong’s banks 15. 
56 A  new  development  is  the  introduction  of  the  QDII  by  the  mainland  Chinese
government. These QDII can act as trustees for foreign investors to invest in mainland
stocks and securities. The Bank of China and a few other mainland banks have been
granted QDII status.  The  Hongkong & Shanghai  Banking  Corporation,  the  Standard
Chartered Bank and Citibank, all of which already operate in Hong Kong, have filed
their applications to become QDII. It is expected that this development will open up yet
another business opportunity for Hong Kong’s banks 16.
57 The Trade Development Council (TDC) is a government-related institution responsible
for  development  of  Hong Kong trade.  According  to  a  paper  published  by  the  TDC,
financial institutions in Hong Kong can benefit from China’s entry to the WTO. Hong
Kong has always been the major source of foreign funds for Chinese enterprises. The
sources include direct investment by Hong Kong companies, funds raised on the Hong
Kong stock market through public listing, and loans by Hong Kong banks. The further
opening  of  China’s  financial  market  following  its  WTO  accession  will  create  more
opportunities  for  Hong  Kong  financial  institutions  to  participate  in  the  mainland
market and will give Hong Kong a chance to strengthen its role as an international
financial centre 17.
58 According  to  another  paper  published  by  the  TDC,  Hong  Kong  banks  have  the
advantage of participating in renminbi deposits business in mainland China. Hong Kong
banks constitute a large foreign banking group in the mainland and will benefit from
further relaxation of rules on foreign banks conducting business in renminbi. Business
opportunities are enormous as 10%-20% of all renminbi deposits, totalling over 10,000
billion yuan, are expected to flow from local to foreign banks 18.
59 Another paper published by the TDC points out that the financial industries of Hong
Kong will  benefit  from four areas of infrastructure construction in mainland China,
namely, infrastructure construction required as a result of WTO entry, the Peking 2008
Olympics,  western inland region development plans and housing reform. Banks will
play a role in the funding of these projects 19. To these projects now must be added the
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2010 Shanghai World Expo projects which China has successfully bid for. These projects
will open up further opportunities for Hong Kong’s financial industry. 
60 The  way  China’s  government  looks  at  Hong  Kong  is  perhaps  most  important  in
discussing the future role of Hong Kong. In a press conference held after the closing of
the Ninth People’s Congress, premier Zhu Rongji delivered the central government’s
optimistic view of Hong Kong’s status as a regional financial centre as follows:
“I think Hong Kong has not lost its strength as Asia’s financial centre. In future, as
the world economy develops, I think there should be some adjustments to the role
of Hong Kong. […] I firmly believe the strong points of Hong Kong have not been
fully utilised. There is no limit to its future role” 20.
61 Premier Zhu did not explain the adjustments that Hong Kong should make. But it is
obvious that,  as China’s economy experiences changes along with its entry into the
WTO, the role of Hong Kong also has to change. In addition to being a financial centre
supporting  the  economic  development  of  China,  Hong  Kong  should  more  actively
explore business opportunities in China. In particular, Hong Kong with its connections
with the outside world should be able to contribute by establishing business relations
between China and the outside world 21.
62 By  2004  foreign  banks  will  be  able  to  conduct  renminbi  business  with  Chinese
enterprises in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian. By 2007, they will be able to deal
with all Chinese enterprises without any geographical restriction. At present quite a
number Hong Kong banks already have branches in China. They include the Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Standard Chartered Bank, the Bank of East Asia,
Citibank, BNP Paribas (formerly Banque Nationale de Paris) and others. Foreign banks
(including Hong Kong’s banks) need to have US$20 billion in assets before they can
apply for a licence. Under current rules, a foreign bank can only have one branch and
can set up one sub-office in the same district each year.
63 Foreign banks, including the Hong Kong banks, are not just competing with mainland
Chinese banks, but also among themselves. Competition is in the following three areas:
1) Foreign banks, including the Hong Kong banks, used to provide services to foreign
companies,  including  Hong  Kong  companies.  Now  they  are  keen  to  extend  these
services  to  mainland  Chinese  companies;  2)  Foreign  banks,  including  Hong  Kong’s
banks, used to provide trade finance to their customers. Now they are keen to expand
into credit card business, unit trusts, investment consultancy, fund management, etc;
3)  Foreign  banks,  including  the  Hong  Kong  banks,  used  to  bring  their  staff  from
overseas and Hong Kong to mainland China. Now they want to recruit local graduates
and experts in China’s financial and legal matters 22.
64 Another  way  the  foreign  banks,  including  Hong  Kong’s  banks,  can  increase  their
presence in the China market is  to acquire associates by investing in the mainland
banks. As an example, the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation has invested in
the Bank of Shanghai and now holds 8% of its shares. This action is beneficial to both
the foreign bank and its associate. The foreign bank can entrust its associate with the
renminbi business. At the same time the mainland bank can learn from its associate
modern banking business. As another example, BNP of France and the China Industrial
and Commercial Bank have jointly set up the Shanghai Paris National Bank 23.
65 According to another paper published by the TDC, compared to mainland banks, Hong
Kong’s  banks  are  more  experienced  in  consumer  banking,  and  are  thus  in  an
advantageous position to capture a significant share of the market. Although they are
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constrained by their small branch networks, they may be more successful in providing
customised services to higher income customers 24.
66 After the Asian financial crisis banks in Hong Kong have experienced hard times with
reduced profits, stiff competition, and the need to improve their business operations.
Competition became keener still following interest rate deregulation in 2001. The major
impact on the banks of deregulation is that they can no longer rely heavily on lending
as a  major  source  of  income.  Banks  will  have  to  expand  their  business  into  non-
interest-earning business such as insurance, stock brokerage, fund management, and
personal  banking services.  This  is  a  development which took place long ago in the
banking sectors of most Western countries.
67 Now that China has gained entry into the WTO, opportunities are open for banks in
Hong Kong to operate in China. Meanwhile Hong Kong will become more important as a
financial centre supporting the economic development of China, especially that of the
Pearl River Delta region. If renminbi exchange controls are gradually relaxed, banks in
Hong Kong will be the first to benefit from the business arising in this area. 
68 Banks in Hong Kong should be prepared for these changes. They must strengthen their
organisational structure and improve their business operations. They must equip their
staff with up-to-date knowledge and expertise in their financial services. They must
adopt advanced technologies for service delivery. Most important, they must be alert to
the  opportunities  open  to  them  in  the  mainland  market.  Hong  Kong’s  role  as  an
international financial centre requires adjustments to be made to bring it in line
following China’s entry to the WTO. Banks in Hong Kong must do the same. 
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